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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
STEPHEN J. HOFFMAN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) NO. 1:09-CV-251
)
CAREFIRST OF FORT WAYNE, INC.,)
d/b/a ADVANCED HEALTHCARE, )
)
Defendant. )
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on: (1) Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, filed by Defendant, Carefirst of Fort Wayne, Inc. 
d/b/a Advanced Healthcare, on April 30, 2010 (DE #14); and (2)
Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Esteban Marcos Coria and 
Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Stephen J. Hoffman, filed by 
Defendant, Carefirst of Fort Wayne, Inc. d/b/a Advanced Healthcare, 
on June 14, 2010 (DE #18). For the reasons set forth below, the 
motion to strike (DE #18) is DENIED. The motion for summary 
judgment (DE #14) is also DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Stephen J. Hoffman, filed his complaint on 
September 8, 2009, and alleged that his employer, Defendant
Carefirst of Fort Wayne, Inc. d/b/a Advanced Healthcare ("Advanced 
Healthcare"), violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),
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42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. , as amended by the ADA Amendments of 
2008, when it allegedly terminated him on January 30, 2009. 
Hoffman claims he is a qualified individual with a disability under 
the ADA because his renal cell carcinoma (which was in remission at 
the time of the alleged termination), constitutes a disability 
under the recent ADA Amendments, and Advanced Healthcare unlawfully 
terminated his employment when it failed to offer him a reasonable 
accommodation. Additionally, Hoffman alleges Advanced Healthcare 
unlawfully terminated his employment because it regarded him as 
being disabled.
Advanced Healthcare filed the instant motion for summary 
judgment on April 30, 2010, arguing that summary judgment is 
appropriate because there are no genuine issues of material fact. 
Specifically, Advanced Healthcare argues that Hoffman failed to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he is not 
"disabled" as defined by the ADA, Hoffman's cancer in remission did 
not substantially limit a major life activity, and he was not 
"regarded as disabled" by Advanced Healthcare. In its reply 
memorandum, Advanced Healthcare contends that even if Hoffman did 
establish a prima facie case, his claim still fails because 
Advanced Healthcare offered a reasonable accommodation.
Advanced Healthcare filed the instant motion to strike on June 
14, 2010, asking the Court to strike the affidavit of Esteban 
Marcos Coria tendered by Hoffman because he was not previously
2
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disclosed as a witness, and to strike Exhibit A to Hoffman's 
affidavit which are Hoffman's notes from his last days of 
employment because the notes are inadmissible hearsay. Hoffman 
responds that it was proper to obtain an opposing affidavit from 
Coria in response to the motion for summary judgment, and that 
Hoffman's notes are admissible as Plaintiff's own statements, 
recorded recollections, and admissions. Both motions are fully 
briefed and ripe for adjudication.
DISCUSSION 
Motion to Strike
First, Advanced Healthcare asks the Court to strike the 
affidavit of Esteban Marcos Coria (Ex. 3, DE #16-5) under Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a) (1) and 37(c) (1), arguing it was 
improper for Hoffman not to previously disclose him as a witness. 
Local Rule 56.1 provides that, in opposing a motion for summary 
judgment, the non-moving party shall file a "Statement of Genuine 
Issues" "setting forth, with appropriate citations to discovery 
responses, affidavits, depositions, or other admissible evidence, 
all material facts as to which it is contended there exists a 
genuine issue necessary to be litigated." L.R. 56.1(a). As 
contended by Hoffman, it is common practice for parties to file 
such affidavits in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. 
This Court is unaware of any authority supporting Advanced
3
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Healthcare's argument that a lay person like Esteban Marcos Coria 
(who was an employee at Advanced Healthcare, and worked alongside 
Hoffman), must be disclosed in the initial disclosures under Rule 
26 (a) (1) . Advanced Healthcare cites Salgado v. General Motors 
Corp., 150 F.3d 735 (7th Cir. 1998), but in that case, the Court 
excluded expert testimony because the plaintiff violated the 
deadline for submitting expert witness reports. In this case, 
Coria was a fellow employee who knew Hoffman, and did not provide 
any expert testimony. As such, the Coria affidavit is admissible.
Second, Advanced Healthcare asks the Court to strike Hoffman's 
purported notes of his last days of employment, attached to his 
affidavit (Ex. 2, DE #16-4), arguing the notes are inadmissible 
hearsay. The remedy requested by Advanced Healthcare, which is 
apparently to strike the 2 pages of type written notes in their 
entirety, is overly broad. Certainly, some of the notes prepared 
by Hoffman (and previously disclosed to Advanced Healthcare), are 
admissible as statements adopted by Hoffman (a party), or recorded 
recollections under Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 803 (5) . 
Additionally, statements in the notes made by David Long (Hoffman's 
supervisor), are admissions by the party-opponent under Rule 
801(d)(2)(D). To the extent Hoffman's notes contain statements 
made by other people (such as a nurse and Hoffman's attorney), 
Hoffman claims these statements are not offered for the truth of 
the matters asserted, but are included so the notes can be viewed
4
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in context. Moreover, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, 
the Court considers only evidence that would be admissible at 
trial. See Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 988 (7th Cir. 
2000) . To the extent that any statements in Hoffman's notes would 
be inadmissible if he offered them at trial, the Court will not 
consider them. The Court can sift through the evidence to consider 
each piece under the applicable federal rules, thus there is no 
need to strike all of Hoffman's notes. Accordingly, the Court 
denies Advanced Healthcare's motion to strike Coria's affidavit and 
Hoffman's notes.
Summary Judgment Motion
The standards that generally govern summary judgment motions 
are familiar. Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, summary judgment is proper only if it is demonstrated 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590 (1993); Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In other words, the record 
must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant. 
Karazanos v. Navistar Int'1 Transp. Corp., 948 F.2d 332, 335 (7th 
Cir. 1991); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
250 (1986) . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court 
must view all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
5
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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; NUCOR Corp. v. Aceros Y Maquilas De 
Occidente, 28 F.3d 572, 583 (7th Cir. 1994).
The burden is upon the movant to identify those portions of 
"the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, " if any, that the 
movant believes "demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the movant has met 
this burden, the nonmovant may not rest upon mere allegations but 
"must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill 
Assocs., Inc., 914 F.2d 107, 110 (7th Cir. 1990); Schroeder v. 
Lufthansa German Airlines, 875 F.2d 613, 620 (7th Cir. 1989). 
"Whether a fact is material depends on the substantive law 
underlying a particular claim and 'only disputes over facts that 
might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will 
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.'" Walter v. 
Fiorenzo, 840 F.2d 427, 434 (7th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original) 
(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
" [A] party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue 
may not rest on its pleading, but must affirmatively demonstrate, 
by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of 
material fact which requires trial." Beard v. Whitley County REMC, 
840 F .2d 405, 410 (7th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original); see also 
Hickey v. A.E. Staley Mfg., 995 F.2d 1385, 1391 (7th Cir. 1993).
6
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Therefore, if a party fails to establish the existence of an 
essential element on which the party bears the burden of proof at 
trial, summary judgment will be appropriate. In this situation, 
there can be "'no genuine issue as to any material fact, 1 since a 
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 
nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts 
immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
Undisputed Material Facts
Hoffman was hired as a service technician by Pharmacare in 
2006. As a technician, he supplied patients with home medical 
devices such as oxygen and wheelchairs. Hoffman traveled from 
Pharmacare's office in Angola, Indiana, to his patients' locations 
by van. (Hoffman Dep., pp. 20-21.) He worked with Pharmacare from 
9:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday (40 hours per 
week). (Hoffman Dep., p. 21.)
In the summer of 2007, Advanced Healthcare purchased 
Pharmacare. Hoffman was offered a service technician position 
similar to the one he held with Pharmacare. (Hoffman Dep., p. 21.) 
On August 28, 2007, Hoffman signed a written job description for 
his service position,, which provided, inter alia, as follows: 
"[a]ble to multi-task, prioritize care, follow complex directions 
and remain flexible within normal working hours and available after 
hours and on call." (Hoffman Dep. Ex. A.) The written job
7
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description also provided " [1]ight day travel required and an 
ability to work in varying locations." (Hoffman Dep., p. 25; 
Hoffman Dep. Ex. A.) When Hoffman first started working for 
Advanced Healthcare, he still worked from 9:00 a.m. until 5:00 
p.m. , and he drove from his home in Angola to Advanced Healthcare's 
office in Angola. (Hoffman Dep., p. 27.)
In November 2007, Hoffman was diagnosed with Stage III Renal 
Carcinoma, and underwent surgery to remove his left kidney. 
(Hoffman Dep., pp. 32-33.) Hoffman informed the owners of the 
company (Chad Bechert and Russ Johnson) of his diagnosis and 
surgery, and they were supportive and told Hoffman they would "be 
behind [Hoffman]." (Hoffman Dep., pp. 33-34.) Hoffman took time 
off from his surgery and recovery, and he received short term 
disability benefits while on medical leave. (Hoffman Dep., pp. 34, 
45.)
Hoffman returned to work at Advanced Healthcare on January 2, 
2008, with no specific restrictions or limitations from his doctors 
on his ability to work, or the hours he could work. (Hoffman Dep., 
pp. 44-45.) Indeed, Hoffman worked his usual schedule throughout 
all of 2008. (Hoffman Dep., p. 46.) Hoffman did not make any 
complaints about any medical issues restricting his ability to 
work. (Def.'s Answ. to Pi.'s Interrog. No. 7, DE #14-2.) Although 
he made no complaint, Hoffman did suffer some fatigue, pain and 
discomfort, particularly from sitting or driving. (Hoffman Dep.,
8
case 1:09-cv-00251-RL document 20 filed 08/31/10 page 9 of 24
pp. 46, 54.) From January 2 008, through January 2009, Hoffman 
performed his normal job responsibilities as a service technician, 
and did not miss any significant time off work (other than 
regularly scheduled doctor visits) . (Hoffman Dep., pp. 54-55.) At 
some point, Hoffman converted his garage to a home office and 
worked out of his house in Angola. (Hoffman Dep., p. 75.)
Hoffman took a two-week vacation with his wife to Hawaii in 
January 2009, and returned to work on January 26, 2009. (Hoffman 
Dep., pp. 53, 57.) Upon his return, Hoffman had a conversation 
with his supervisor, David Long, about events that had occurred 
while Hoffman was on vacation. (Hoffman Dep., pp. 57-58.) Long 
told Hoffman that Advanced Healthcare had acquired a contract with 
the Parkview Hospital system, and that all service technicians, 
including Hoffman, were needed to work overtime. (Hoffman Dep., 
pp. 57-58.) Hoffman responded, " [f] ine, I want to keep my job, 
yes." (Hoffman Dep., p. 58.)
Then, on Wednesday, January 28, 2009, Long called Hoffman into 
a meeting. Long began by telling Hoffman he was concerned about 
his health, and how this would affect him physically. (Hoffman 
Aff. Ex. A.) Long told Hoffman that he and the other service 
technicians needed to work overtime on the new contract, between 65 
and 70 hours per week. (Hoffman Dep., p. 58; Hoffman Aff., Ex. A.) 
Hoffman told him, "I can't do that [Long] . If you do that, you 
will put me in the grave." (Hoffman Dep., p. 58.) Long also told
9
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Hoffman that in addition to working the extra hours, he would have 
to come to Fort Wayne to do a night shift once a week, and to be on 
call on weekends. (Hoffman Dep. , p. 59.) Hoffman did not feel 
singled out by these requests - he admits that the other service 
technicians were being asked to do overtime as well because of the 
new account. (Hoffman Dep., pp. 60-61.)
The next day, January 29, 2009, Hoffman provided a handwritten 
note from one of his doctors, Dr. Kenneth Pennington, stating 
" [p]atient may not work more than 8 hours/day, 5 days/week. Dx: 
Stage III renal cancer." (Hoffman Dep., pp. 63-64; Hoffman Aff. 
Ex. B.) That same afternoon, Long telephoned Hoffman to discuss 
the doctor's note. (Hoffman Dep., pp. 65-66.) Long told Hoffman 
he needed to investigate, and according to Hoffman, was "very 
confrontational." (Hoffman Dep., p. 66.) Long reiterated his wish 
that Hoffman work a 6 5 to 70 hour work week. (Hoffman Dep., p. 
66.) Hoffman told him, "if you are going to make me do this 
seventy hour week workload, I will probably, will not be able to be 
employed with you. I will have to seek employment elsewhere." 
(Hoffman Dep., p. 66.) Long ended the conversation by saying he 
wanted to talk with Hoffman the next day. (Hoffman Aff. Ex. A.)
On January 30, 2009 (the next day), Hoffman and Long met in 
Fort Wayne at noon. (Hoffman Dep., p. 69.) Long said he talked to 
one of the owners, Chad Bechert (who was in Florida on vacation) 
the previous night, and that Hoffman had two options: first, he
10
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could hand in a letter of resignation immediately; or second, he 
could work the overtime like the other service technicians. 
(Hoffman Dep., p. 7 0 .) Hoffman said he could not do either - he 
was not going to resign, and he couldn't do the extra work, so Long 
would have to fire him. (Hoffman Dep., p. 7 0; Hoffman Aff. Ex. A.) 
Long then told Hoffman that he could not write a letter of 
termination - it could only be written by Bechert or the Human 
Resources Director, Amy Fisher. (Hoffman Dep., p. 7 0 .) Long 
indicated he would have Fisher type up the letter of termination 
and give it to Hoffman by the end of the day. (Hoffman Dep., p. 
7 0 .) Hoffman worked until the end of his day, and when he could 
not find Long at the end of the day, he left work. (Hoffman Dep., 
pp. 7 0-7 1 .) Long called him when he was en route, and told Hoffman 
he would drop off the termination letter when Long came to 
Hoffman's home on Monday to pick up the company van. (Hoffman 
Dep., p . 73.)
Later the same day, Friday January 3 0 , 2 0 0 9, Long called 
Hoffman again and told Hoffman he was not going to fire Hoffman. 
(Hoffman Dep., p. 7 3 .) Long told Hoffman he could limit his work 
to 40 hours per week, but he would need to work out of the Fort 
Wayne office. (Hoffman Dep., p. 7 3-7 4 .) Long said that he was not 
firing Hoffman - he wanted Hoffman to close up his home office and 
work out of Fort Wayne. (Hoffman Dep., p. 7 3 .) In response, 
Hoffman told Long " [y]ou have already fired me and I am not going
11
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to add another two hours to my day, drive down to Fort Wayne, do an 
eight hour job and then go back home." (Hoffman Dep., p. 75.)
The next day, Saturday, January 31, 2009, Hoffman visited an 
attorney. That same day, Long had a telephone conversation with 
Hoffman that was recorded by Hoffman. In pertinent part, the 
conversation was:
Long: I don't claim to be a perfectionist when it 
comes to handling things on the HR side of 
things. Uh - I can't terminate somebody 
that's not doing . . . that's doing a fine job 
. . . there's no cause for termination for 
you.
Hoffman: Well
Long: After talking with Jeff he said we're not 
going to terminate someone who's not . . . 
there's nothing in his file there's nothing to 
terminate. What we can say is we want you to 
be working there and I need to do some 
investigation into your doctor's note. . . 
What we're offering is . . . you can come to 
Ft. Wayne work your eight hour day it's over 
urn. That's, that's our offer. That's 
something that. That's fine. But, we're not 
going to dismiss somebody when it's not a 
performance issue. The fact is, we need the 
help.
* * * * *
Long: Cause like I said from the beginning I'm not I 
need to talk to HR about how to handle it from 
here. You said I wish to be terminated and I 
said okay if that's what you want then I'll 
get with Amy and Jeff because I'm not going to 
fire somebody without cause. We need to 
investigate this medical condition a little 
bit more. What we can offer Sam is a change 
whatever. Eight hours is all he can work come 
to Ft. Wayne do his eight hours go home . . . 
investigate this medical matter.
12
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Hoffman: So are you saying then my hours are going to
be from 7 in the morning when I leave here to 
go down there and work the 8 - five days come 
home and get home at 6 o'clock that's three 
hours of no pay at all whereas uh from my 
whole experience has been 9-5 and you changed 
that to 8 to 5 and what I've been working is 8 
to 4 uh the whole time because I work right 
through lunch period and that is an eight hour 
day from Angola and so now you're saying my 
day has changed to an eleven hour day instead 
of an eight hour day.
Long: I'm asking you to drive to work like everybody
else does. We've got guys that live in Warsaw 
guys that live in Roanoke.
(Hofffman Aff. Ex. C.)
Hoffman then left a voicemail message for Long on January 31,
2009, which stated as follows:
Hi Dave it's Sam. Just, uh, wanted to get back 
with you, uh, about your conversation yesterday. A 
lot of mixed messages there. I got a, I just 
needed to know what you are planning for Monday. I 
need to know what you're talking about there, so 
give me a call back tonight . . . .
(Hoffman Dep. Ex. K.)
On Sunday, February 1, 2009, Hoffman again left a voicemail 
message for Long:
Hi Dave it's Sam. I'm just calling in to let you 
know, uh, I'm not feeling well, I'm sick. Uh, uh, 
call it a sick day tomorrow. I will not be there 
tomorrow. Uh, just thought I'd let you know. I'm 
going to try and talk to a doctor tomorrow, but uh,
I'll get in touch with you later. Ok, thanks.
Bye.
13
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(Hoffman Dep. Ex. K.) Hoffman did not go to the doctor as planned 
on Monday, February 2, 2009. (Hoffman Dep., p. 82.)
On the evening of February 2, 2009, Hoffman left a voicemail 
message with Long:
Hi Dave, this is Sam. Uh, it's, uh, Monday evening 
about 6:30. Because you terminated me on Friday, 
uh afternoon, effective at 4 pm, uh, you can come 
and get the van, and, uh, equipment. Uh, it's all 
gonna be loaded in the van. Uh, whenever you want 
to come, you wanna come up tomorrow, that's fine.
Uh, if you, uh, need any further information, you 
can call my lawyer, uh, John Schwartz, at . . .  .
Thanks a lot. Bye.
(Hoffman Dep. Ex. K.) Hoffman followed up his voicemail message
with an e-mail to Long later that evening which is as follows:
Since you terminated my employment with Advanced 
Healthcare on Friday the 30th of Jan., I am 
informing you that the van is loaded with all the 
equipment from my garage. The phone and GPS are in 
the front seat under the workclothes. The key is 
in the tailpipe. You may come to pick up the van 
tomorrow. If you have any questions you may call 
my attorney as I mentioned in my message to you on 
your cell phone this evening. Please have Josh 
mail my check for the oil change and January rent.
(Hoffman Dep. Ex. L.)
Hoffman never asked any of his doctors whether it would be 
permissible for him to work forty hours a week, and commute to the 
Fort Wayne office. (Hoffman Dep., pp. 93-94.) When Hoffman left 
Dr. Pennington's office on February 26, 2009, Dr. Pennington
thought Hoffman was doing well and did not need to see him for 
another six months. (Hoffman Dep., p. 103.) A CT scan performed 
on February 24, 2009, revealed no recurrence of the cancer.
14
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(Hoffman Dep., p. 101.) As of the date of his deposition in this 
case, March 10, 2010, no doctor has told Hoffman that his cancer 
has reoccurred. (Hoffman Dep., p. 111.) Although Hoffman 
continues to be in remission from his cancer, Dr. Pennington told 
Hoffman that in 80% of the cases, the cancer returns during the 
first two years, and that 60% die. (Hoffman Dep., p. 42.)
Is Hoffman Disabled Under The Recently Amended ADA?
The ADA makes it unlawful for an employer to "discriminate 
against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard 
to . . . terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 
U.S.C. § 12112(a) . "To prevail on an ADA claim, the plaintiff must 
show (1) he is disabled; (2) he is qualified to perform the 
essential function of the job with or without reasonable 
accommodation; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action 
because of his disability." EEOC v. Lee's Log Cabin, 546 F.3d 438, 
442 (7th Cir. 2008). The ADA defines "disability" with respect to 
an individual as (A) "a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such 
individual"; (B) "a record of such an impairment"; or (C) "being 
regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
Hoffman claims that his Stage III renal cancer, which was 
admittedly in remission during the time frame that gave rise to 
this action, constitutes a "disability" under the ADA. Advanced
15
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Healthcare argues that because Hoffman did not have a physical 
impairment which substantially limited a major life activity in 
January 2009, he was not disabled under the ADA.
Effective January 1, 2009, Congress amended the ADA to 
"[reinstate] a broad scope of protection." See ADA Amendments Act 
of 2008 ("ADAAA") , Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat 3553 (2008). 
Specifically, Congress found that the United States Supreme Court 
had improperly narrowed the protection intended to be afforded 
under the ADA, and the ADAAA rejected the holdings of Sutton v. 
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), and Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002). 
Although the ADAAA left the ADA's three-category definition of 
"disability" intact, significant changes were made to how the 
categories are to be interpreted. Importantly, the ADAAA clarified 
that the operation of "major bodily functions," including 
"functions of the immune system," constitute major life activities 
under the ADA's first definition of disability. Id. at 3555. 
Moreover, the ADAAA very clearly provides that "an impairment that 
is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would 
substantially limit a major life activity when active." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(4)(D) (emphasis added).
Not surprisingly, Advanced Healthcare argues that Hoffman did 
not have a physical impairment which substantially limited any 
major life activity in January 2009 - his cancer was in remission,
16
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he returned to work without restrictions, he carried out his 
regular job duties of 40 hours a week as a service technician for 
a full year, and he did not miss any significant time off work. 
Moreover, Advanced Healthcare argues, without providing case law or 
legislative history in support of its position, that it "highly 
doubts that Congress intended all cancer survivors in remission, 
with no medical evidence of active disease, to be considered 
disabled as a matter of law for the rest of their lives." (Reply 
Mem., p. 3.) In response, Hoffman contends that the clear wording 
of section 12102(4) (D) ("an impairment that is episodic or in 
remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major 
life activity when active"), renders Hoffman's renal cancer (in 
remission) a disability.
This Court has tried in vain to find analogous case law in 
which the central issue is whether an individual with cancer in 
remission is considered "disabled" under the ADAAA. Because the 
ADAAA amendments have been ruled as not retroactive, see, e.g., 
Winsley v. Cook County, 563 F.3d 598, 600 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2009), at 
this point in time, there is a lack of case law on this issue. The 
Amendments went into effect on January 1, 2009. Pub. L. No. 110­
325, 112 Stat. 3553. Since the alleged discriminatory action 
happened in this case during late January 2009, the parties agree 
that the Amendments apply. This is one of the first cases of its 
kind to make it to the summary judgment phase, where the new ADAAA
17
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standard is applicable.
The ADAAA states that "it is the intent of Congress that the 
primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should 
be whether entities covered under the ADA have complied with their 
obligations. . . Id. at 3 554. Therefore, the "question of
whether an individual's impairment is a disability under the ADA 
should not demand extensive analysis." Id. This Court is bound 
by the clear language of the AD AAA. Because it clearly provides 
that "an impairment that is episodic or in remission is a 
disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity 
when active," and neither side disputes that Stage III Renal 
Cancer, when active, constitutes a disability, this Court must find 
that Hoffman was "disabled" under the ADAAA. In other words, under 
the ADAAA, because Hoffman had cancer in remission (and that cancer 
would have substantially limited a major life activity when it was 
active), Hoffman does not need to show that he was substantially 
limited in a major life activity at the actual time of the alleged 
adverse employment action.
This conclusion is further bolstered by the EEOC's 
interpretive guidance.1 The EEOC issued a Notice of Proposed
^Advanced Healthcare argues, without citing any case law, 
that Hoffman is precluded from relying upon the EEOC interpretive 
guide to support his claim because the guidelines were not 
published until September 23, 2009, approximately 8 months after 
the actions at issue in this case. Whether or not the EEOC's 
regulations are "retroactive" is not the issue here. Rather, the 
Court includes this discussion of the EEOC's interpretation of
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Rulemaking to implement the amendments in 2 9 C.F.R. Part 1630,
which specifically provides that "cancer" is an example of
"impairments that are episodic or in remission," and is therefore
considered to be a disability. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2 (g) (4) .
Additionally, it states that:
Examples of Impairments that Will Consistently Meet 
the Definition of Disability - . . . include, but
are not limited to - (B) Cancer, which
substantially limits major life activities such as 
normal cell growth. . .
29 C.F.R. 1630.2(g)(5). Thus, under the clear language of the 
ADAAA, the Court finds that Hoffman was indeed "disabled" under the 
ADA.
Did Advanced Healthcare Offer A Reasonable Accommodation?
Discrimination under the ADA may be shown in two ways: by
showing a failure to accommodate or by presenting evidence of 
disparate treatment. Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 256 F.3d 568, 
572 (7th Cir. 2001). In this case, Hoffman asserts that Advanced 
Healthcare failed to accommodate him. To establish a failure to 
accommodate claim, the plaintiff must show the employer was aware 
of his disability and failed to provide a reasonable accommodation, 
in addition to the initial showing that he is a qualified 
individual with a disability. Id. at 572. Further, it is unlawful
the ADAAA (which clearly was in place at the time of the alleged 
discriminatory action), as another tool to glean the intended 
meaning of the Amendments.
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for an employer to fail to make reasonable accommodations to the 
known physical limitations of an employee unless the employer can 
demonstrate that such accommodations would constitute an undue 
hardship on the business under the particular circumstances. 2 9 
C.F.R. § 1630.9(a). Importantly, the defendant bears the burden to 
prove that the employee's suggested reasonable accommodation will 
create an undue hardship on the defendant. Oconomowoc Residential 
Programs v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2002).
Advanced Healthcare moved for summary judgment in this case. 
In support of its motion, it provided an 18-page memorandum, 
addressing whether Hoffman was disabled/regarded as disabled under 
the ADA. Advanced Healthcare then stated that because Hoffman 
failed to establish his prima facie case that he was disabled/or 
that Advanced Healthcare perceived him as being disabled, "there is 
no need for Advanced Healthcare, nor this Court, to engage in the 
reasonable accommodation analysis." (Mem. In Supp. of Def.'s Mot. 
For Summ. J., p. 17.) Then, Advanced Healthcare dropped a footnote 
stating "[t]he expressed willingness of Advanced Healthcare to 
limit Hoffman to a 40 hour work week would certainly appear to have 
been a reasonable accommodation." (Id., n.4.) Such lack of
analysis leaves the Court in a bind on a summary judgment motion.2
2Query whether Advanced Healthcare sufficiently raised this 
argument in its opening memorandum. It is well settled that when 
a party raises an argument for the first time in a reply brief, 
it is deemed waived. See, e.g., Nelson v. Lacrosse County 
District Attorney, 301 F.3d 820, 836 (7th Cir. 2002). Even
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In its response in opposition, Hoffman did argue that Hoffman's 
desire to continue his normal hours and work out of Angola (so he 
would not have to add 2 hours to each workday commuting to Fort 
Wayne), was reasonable, and that Advanced Healthcare failed to 
carry its burden to show that the accommodation would cause an 
undue hardship. (Pl.'s Br. In Opp., pp. 8-9.) Finally, in its 
reply memorandum, Advanced Healthcare cursorily argued that the 
accommodation Hoffman desired was not one that Advanced Healthcare 
was required to provide, citing Hoffman v. Caterpillar, 256 F.3d 
568, 577 (7th Cir. 2001); Jay v. Internet Wagner, Inc., 233 F.3d 
1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding it was the employer's
prerogative to choose a reasonable accommodation; an employer is 
not required to provide the particular accommodation that an 
employee requests); Schmidt v. Methodist Hospital of Indiana, Inc. , 
89 F . 3d 342, 344 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that " [r] easonable
accommodation does not require an employer to provide literally 
everything the disabled employee requests").
In this case, Advanced Healthcare concedes that "[t]he 
accommodation Hoffman himself wanted, [was] working out of Angola 
rather than traveling to and from Fort Wayne." (Reply Mem., p. 7.) 
This accommodation seems reasonable on its face. Hoffman already 
had a home office in Angola, and had clients in the vicinity.
assuming, arguendo, that Advanced Healthcare did not waive the 
argument regarding reasonable accommodation, as set forth in more 
detail below, Advanced Healthcare's position still fails.
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According to an affidavit by Esteban Marcos Coria, a co-worker of 
Hoffman's, after Hoffman no longer worked for Advanced Healthcare, 
he and other service technicians "were responsible, almost daily, 
for SEVERAL deliveries to Angola and the surrounding area including
Kendallvilie, Howe, Orland, Fremont, and even cities in
Northwestern Ohio and Southeastern Michigan." (Coria Aff., f 6
(emphasis in original).) After Hoffman's departure, the increased 
workload for the other service technicians increased the overtime 
that Advanced Healthcare had to pay, as well as additional expenses 
for driving. (Id. 7, 8.) As such, Hoffman has carried his 
initial burden of showing that his proposed accommodation was 
reasonable on its face.
Advanced Healthcare baldly retorts that it was not required to 
provide this accommodation sought by Hoffman. However, Advanced 
Healthcare fails to carry its burden of showing that the 
accommodation would create an undue hardship on the defendant. 
Oconomowoc, 300 F.3d at 783; U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 
U.S. 391 (2002) (holding once the plaintiffs have made a prima 
facie showing that the accommodation is reasonable on its face, the 
defendant must come forward to demonstrate unreasonableness or 
undue hardship in the particular circumstances). Advanced 
Healthcare fails to provide any evidence that the requested 
accommodation would create an undue burden - how much would it 
cost? How would it affect other service technicians' workload?
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Were there enough customers in the Angola area to justify Hoffman 
having a continuous home office there? Clearly, a question of fact 
remains whether Hoffman's requested accommodation was reasonable. 
For the same reasons, although Advanced Healthcare claims .its 
proposed accommodation was reasonable (for Hoffman to work an eight 
hour work day out of Fort Wayne) , again, the Court lacks the 
evidence of the particular circumstances at this time to determine 
whether that proposed accommodation was truly reasonable or not. 
Thus, there is a triable issue as to whether Advanced Healthcare 
failed to provide a reasonable accommodation.
Finally, the Court notes that although Advanced Healthcare 
characterizes Hoffman as "voluntarily" ending his employment 
(Reply, p. 1) , Advanced Healthcare fails to argue or provide any 
legal support for the proposition that Hoffman was not subject to 
an adverse employment action because of his disability, or that he 
was not terminated. Again, because of the way Advanced Healthcare 
structured its very narrow motion for summary judgment, these are 
issues that survive in the case for another day.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the motion to strike (DE #18) 
is DENIED and the motion for summary judgment (DE #14) is also 
DENIED.
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DATED: August 31, 2010 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge 
United States District Court
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